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Abstract.  This article provides commentary on the forensic psychological task to develop information 
bearing on penalties for convicted terrorists. 
 
One characteristic of the criminal justice systems of representative democracies is an attempted 
exemplification of a rule of law.  One characteristic of this rule of law is a set of transgressions--each of 
which is linked with a penalty, range of penalties, or other consequence to be implemented upon 
conviction for each transgression.  Especially when an individual is convicted of a transgression that can 
lead to more than one possible penalty or of more than one transgression leading to different penalties, 
forensic psychologists--usually psychiatrists and clinical psychologists--can be called on to develop 
information that may affect the penalty or penalties Issued forth by a court.  The question is whether 
forensic psychologists have anything useful to contribute and, if so, whether the utility stems from any 
special area of expert knowledge. 
 
For example, a psychiatrist recently testified for the defense in the case of Khalfan Khamis Mohamed 
who already had been convicted for his role in the 1998 terrorist bombing of the United States Embassy 
in Tanzania.  The psychiatrist contributed information about the convicted terrorist that the defense 
lawyers believed would help mitigate against a death penalty.  The psychiatrist asserted that Mr. 
Mohamed was unquestioning in obeying orders from complicit colleagues at one time but now believed 
that taking innocent victims was not justified under any circumstances.  The psychiatrist also asserted 
that Mr. Mohamed's contributions to terrorism were only taken under a commitment to attenuate the 
suffering of Muslims around the world.  As well, the psychiatrist asserted that Mr. Mohamed now 
expressed tearful remorse for his actions, was uneducated, lost his father at an early age, was easily led 
by others, and felt pained at being a minor player in the hierarchy of the terrorist plot. 
 
What is one to do with such information based on the premises that a priori and ex post facto intent, 
motives, phenomenology, behavioral tendencies, and events may be relevant in issuing a penalty?  
Given these premises, the psychiatrist's information may be of use.  However, it is difficult to identify 
the special area of expert knowledge that gives a unique status to the forensic psychologist in this case.  
One difficulty is that psychiatrists and clinical psychologists by definition and tradition are steeped in the 
art and science of psychopathology.  However, psychopathology does not seem to be a mitigating Issue 
in published accounts of the psychiatrist's testimony.  Another difficulty is that the psychiatrist's 
pertinent testimony could well be imparted by many kinds of professionals and, indeed, by many kinds 
of people.  Thirdly, forensic psychologists often are no more knowledgeable of scientific research on 
what be considered pertinent psychological information than the "great unwashed" who are not 
considered experts. 
 
With remorse as an example, the court was not informed that stated remorse can very effectively be an 
impression management strategy that can elicit expectations that a future negative act will not be 
committed and, also, feelings of forgiveness in others (Gold & Weiner, 2000).  The same applies for 
findings that stated remorse--sincere or not-- has been found to affect the nature of an assigned 
sentence (Pipes & Alessi, 1999), to activate belief systems concerning health, philosophy, religion, and 
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politics that lead to forgiveness (Scobie & Scobie, 1998), to elicit forgiveness depending on what 
cognitions have previously been activated among potential forgivers (Takaku et al., 2001), and to be 
difficult to discriminate between sincere and feigned versions (Blackman & Stubbs, 2001). 
 
One could make a strong argument that--in this case--a forensic psychologist had no special expertise.  
One might also assert that the forensic psychologist could have been effectively countered with a social 
psychologist or other behavioral scientist familiar with the scientific literature on remorse, apology, and 
forgiveness.  Finally, one might conclude that through letting psychological testimony focus only on the 
presence or absence of mitigating characteristics--as opposed to the social psychology of these 
characteristics in the context of a legal hearing--justice may not be served. 
 
(IBPP Note:  After this article was written, the federal jury adjudicating the case of Mr. Mohamed 
deadlocked on whether to impose the death penalty.  Thus, through the application of relevant law, Mr. 
Mohamed will be given a life sentence without the possibility of parole.  Also, according to the verdict 
form, none of the 12 jurors agreed that Mr. Mohamed felt remorse for the bombing.) 
 
(See Gold, G.J., & Weiner, B.  (2000). Remorse, confession, group identity, and expectancies about 
repeating a transgression.  Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 22, 291-300; Pipes, R.B., & Alessi, M.  
(1999). Remorse and a previously punished offense in assignment of punishment and estimated 
likelihood of a repeated offense.  Psychological Reports, 85, 246-248; Scobie, E.D., & Scobie, G.E.W.  
(1998). Damaging events: The perceived need for forgiveness.  Journal for the Theory of Social 
Behaviour, 28, 373-401; Takaku, S., Weiner, B., & Ohbuchi, K-I.  (2001). A cross-cultural examination of 
the effects of apology and perspective taking on forgiveness.  Journal of Language and Social Psychology, 
20, 144-166; Weiser, B.  (June 28, 2001).  Defense psychiatrist tells jury of Embassy bomber's remorse.  
The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com.) (Keywords: Forensic Psychology, Mohamed, Terrorism.) 
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